Course: POLSCI 275-01 Left, Right, and Center, Duke University
Instructor: Michael Hawley
Peer Editor: Adela Guo
In the Reflections of the Revolution in France published in 1790, Edmund Burke attacks against the French Revolution in its form and nature. Burke identifies one of its fundamental problems that made it a complete catastrophe: the French Revolution was too rational. It primarily appealed to abstract metaphysics, overlooking and sabotaging the intricacy of society and human nature. This argument is illustrated and supported in his threefold analysis of the French Revolution’s problems: (1) its ignorance of inherited traditions and collective wisdom; (2) its repulsion of sentiments and prejudices; (3) its abolishment of the church establishment and its connection to the state.
Inherited Rights, Wisdoms, and Traditions
Burke straightforwardly expresses his disapproval of the French Revolution, stating that the doctrines and purported rationales were “given from the pulpits”, principally drawn from abstract preaches and metaphysics of the scholars and philosophers, without considering the specific realities and intricacies (Reflections, 110). Instead, he believes that a construction or renovation of a state or a regime is an experimental science. It should be rather based on practical knowledge and experience to achieve a practical purpose of establishing or renovating an actual government in real human societies (Reflections, 152).
Burke voices against a government constructed in the values of speculative natural rights. He argues that, in such a form of government, people have the rights to everything, and consequently, they would want everything, driven by their fundamental human need. It is among the people’s “rights” that their own and others’ “wants” are managed and restricted by a separate and superior force. Thus, a form of government shall be established to regulate these “wants” and safeguard these “rights”, in both individual and collective domains. However, due to the intricacy and variability of such rights and forms of restriction on these rights, it is unreliable to construct such regulating force out of abstract rules, because they are static and unspecific. In consequence, such a form of government is only perfect in theory while it cannot adjust to human complexity in practice – “their abstract perfection is their practical defect” (Reflections, 151). A construction or renovation of the government, according to Burke, must connect the liberties with all aspects of an intricate human society – discipline of armies, proper collection of revenue, morality and religion, integrity of properties, peace and order, etc. – to make society stable and sound (Reflections, 90-91). A revolution based on abstract and metaphysical liberties usually fails to do so, leaving it meaningless and precarious.
To accomplish that goal, it generally requires a considerable amount of practical knowledge and experiences, which could be a lot more than any person can acquire in his entire life. Therefore, Burke contends that people should make use of the accumulated wisdom and practical experiences established, tested, maintained by past generations, who have already approved their utility within a unique social context (Reflections, 152). Those are the inherited rights, collective wisdom, and longstanding traditions that people can readily reference to reinforce their liberties. Nonetheless, the French Revolution hardly appealed or referred to these precious inheritances but tearing down the edifice of traditions and building up a mirage consisting of only abstract foundations.
In his analysis of the British constitutional traditions through the Glorious Revolution, Burke rebuts Dr. Price’s approval of the French Revolution based on the abstract “natural rights”. He rejects the claim that the Glorious Revolution established the principles of people electing and cashiering their own governors. He defends that it was only a slight deviation from the hereditary lineage, but still contained within a set of inherited traditions and constitutional orders that are embraced by the English people and society (Reflections, 99-100). He analyzes that, from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Rights, the British society constructed and defended their liberties as “an entailed inheritance derived from [their] forefathers” and “transmitted to [their] posterity”, without referencing any form of a priori reasoning of general, natural rights (Reflections, 118-119). The freedom of Englishmen under a hereditary monarchy, inherited from the accumulation of practical wisdoms along the patrimonial lineage, was therefore unique to, effective in, and accepted by the English society.
Importance of Irrationality in the Forms of Sentiments and Prejudices
In his criticism of the French Revolution, Burke points out that a new “conquering empire of light and reason” dissolved the “pleasing illusions” which stabilize, pacify, and coordinate the society (Reflections, 171). He emphasizes that sentiments are passed on through generations, sometimes retaining the longstanding prejudices thus profound collective wisdom. For a society, they are sometimes needed as “supplements or correctives to manners” and always required as “aids to laws” (Reflections, 172).
In examining the relations between institutions and sentiments, Burke rebuts the idea that laws and orders must be rooted in terrors and concerns, “destitute of all taste and elegance” (Reflections, 171). In fact, rightful sentiments and legitimate prejudices turn people’s duties to a society or an institution into a habit and a nature of their own. To make people loyal and attached to these institutions, the state must first establish such sentiments as “love, veneration, admiration, [and] attachment” as part of the commonwealth. This encourages people to follow the laws and orders not because of rational fears but due to respect and affection of such laws. On the contrary, in a state constructed upon “mechanic philosophy” and purely rational principles, the institutions can never be embodied in persons, where people only adhere to them out of a series of unconnected rational judgements and animal instincts instead of constant social affiliation to the state and its institutions (Reflections, 172, 183).
Therefore, prejudices and reasons are inseparable in nature, as prejudice combined with its reason “has a motive to give actions to that reason” (Reflections, 183). Burke argues that prejudice is charged with untaught and unspoken guidelines that are steady and pre-tested, providing additional insights to facilitate advantageous and morally virtuous judgements and decisions. Particularly in an event of emergency or abruptness, prejudice could aid people in making rapid yet appropriate moves without hesitation. Thus, it is necessary that in the natural feelings of love, admiration, and attachment, people “learn great lessons” to instruct their own reason and avert tragic consequences out of human animality (Reflections, 175-177).
Some would argue that the French Revolution’s violence and cruelty was due to irrationality of the revolutionaries. However, according to Burke, the cause of violence and cruelty could be the lack of just prejudice, namely moral virtues, to accompany and discipline their reason. Without actual love to the nation, admiration of the monarch, reverence of the institutions and traditions, and even sympathy to the victims as human beings, the reason of acquiring more power to the revolutionaries – in the name of securing more rights for the people – took over the entire control of their judgements. To accomplish this object, they cared about no consequences and subjected themselves to no higher constraint (such as morality). In this case, they degraded themselves to the level of ferocious beasts fighting over territories and dominance, exposing their pure animal natures rather than human irrationality that developed over the enlightened history of humankind.
Relations Between State and Religion
Burke condemns that in the French Revolution, bishops were slaughtered, religious establishments were abolished, and church estates were deprived. The revolutionaries reasoned that the excessive power of church should be undermined, and the enormous estate controlled by the church should return to the state, in consideration of constructing “true equality” and consolidating the authority of their own. He insists that religion is the basis of a civilized society in moral senses beyond simple rationality, and that the religious establishment is necessary and inseparable from the state establishment with integral rights to its own finance and properties (Reflections, 188, 197-199).
Burke first justifies the English model of religion-state connection as a collective and inherited wisdom constituting the traditions and constitutional orders in Britain. He contends that such establishment of church paves the way for the continuous construction of human morality and fundamental social principles against fraud, violence, injustice, and tyranny. It sets the ground for those who administer the government to pursue a solid and permanent existence to glory rather than the “paltry pelf of the moment”. Burke thinks that religion serves as a connection between generations in the past, the present, and the future to consolidate a continuous inheritance of the principles and objects of the society (Reflections, 188-189).
According to Burke, a consecrated religious attachment is necessary to establish a moral regulation and constraint on the people. “It is the public ornament. It is the public consolation. It nourishes public hope” (Reflections, 197). For both the rich and the poor within a society, consolation of religion is indispensable in their spiritual level as their instructions (Reflections, 201). The consecration of a society through a state religious establishment brings about a higher authority and overarching awe upon its citizens, subjecting the people and their exercises of rights and freedom under moral constraints (Reflections, 190). This moral and spiritual actor beyond rationality serves as an organizer and coordinator of human reasons and rational actions. In the absence of such an establishment of religion where the popular authority is absolute and unrestrained, people act without being held responsible to the greater controlling power on earth. This gives them a false impression and confidence that opinions and actions out of their own wills are approved by the public wills and judgements, and this inaccurately disapproves of any enforcements or punishments on the people from the hands of other people. Therefore, without a superior power to coordinate these actions and to implement such enforcements, such society is only a fraudulent democracy where no public wills and forces are represented and enforced (Reflections, 190-191).
Burke also argues that the establishment of church is vital in the education of the people. In all stages of education from infancy to adulthood, churches and ecclesiastics play the primary role in providing both moral instructions and practical knowledge to the people. By dispatching ecclesiastics to visit foreign countries and link their experiences to their knowledge after schools and universities, the church establishes a self-renovating connection between the input and output of knowledge, further improving the collective wisdom of a society (Reflections, 198).
As a result, Burke firmly believes that such an establishment of church must not be abolished and should be connected to the establishment of state to defend the “irrational” sphere of a society. Burke harshly criticizes that the French Revolution sabotaged the integrity of church functions and the independence of church estates by making all ecclesiastics servants of the state and confiscating all church properties (Reflections, 199). He argues that it is never fair to convert the fixed estates of the church to the fiscal revenues of a state, which could be delayed, withheld, or even extinguished in the name of “fiscal difficulties” that are usually manipulated by the politicians due to their immorality. When incorporated as part of the state organs under politicians and bureaucrats, churches could be split into factions that no longer serve their moral and practical functions (Reflections, 199). Therefore, Burke promotes an establishment of church that is connected to the state but remains independent financially and functionally.
Conclusion
In the Reflections of the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke identifies an underlying problem of the French Revolution: overemphasis on rationality in the forms of abstract foundations and ignorance of social complexity. Burke does not completely disvalue rationality, instead he thinks that pure rationality is far from sufficient – in fact, he promotes a “rational liberty” that is based on rationality but also appeals to humanness and morality. Without the reference of traditions and inherited wisdom, the guidance of sentiments and prejudice, and the constraints of moral virtues and religious attachment, the liberties that the French Revolution pursued only left in metaphysics but never thrived in the intricate, variant, and civilized society that is way beyond pure rationality.
